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persistent declines in SSDI beneficiaries in the surrounding communities. In this case, there may be pentup demand for SSDI benefits as normal operations resume in areas where the economy has not fully
recovered. Nevertheless, unemployment insurance expansions and other government support programs
were materially different than in past recessions, which appears to have enabled people to weather the
downturn and avoid applying for SSDI benefits. In this paper, we draw on prior research and recent federal
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The US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is designed to insure American
workers against earnings losses from severe, permanent disabilities. In 2019, on the eve of the COVID19 pandemic, nearly 8.4 million disabled workers were receiving SSDI benefits (SSA 2021)—equivalent
to 5 percent of the civilian labor force (BLS 2022). Including the additional 2.8 million nondisabled
dependents and adult children of retired, deceased, and disabled workers, the SSDI program paid benefits
to nearly 11.2 million beneficiaries in 2019 (SSA 2021). SSDI benefits are paid out of payroll tax revenue
supplemented with reserves from the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, which is overseen by a Board
of Trustees.
Each year the Trustees are required to provide a report to Congress on the outlook of the DI Trust
Fund (as well as the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund). In April 2020, the Trustees’ report
projected that the DI Trust Fund would be depleted in 2065, without incorporating into their projections
the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had been declared a global pandemic by the World Health
Organization only a month earlier, in March 2020. The 2021 report updated the projected depletion date
of the DI Trust Fund to 2057. In 2022, however, the Trustees projected that the DI Trust Fund would no
longer be depleted within the 75-year projection period. DI Trust Fund projections rely on assumptions
about several factors that affect both the size and composition of the population receiving benefits as well
as the number and characteristics of the people paying into the system. These include demographic
assumptions about fertility, mortality, and immigration; economics assumptions about employment, real
wage growth, real interest rates, and inflation; and programmatic assumptions about DI prevalence,
average benefits, and household composition of DI beneficiaries.
The pandemic affected all of these factors, at least in the short run, but likely at least some factors
in the long run as well. In this paper, we focus primarily on the potential ways the pandemic may have
affected the DI Trust Fund through the pathway of changing DI incidence.
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The SSDI Program on the Eve of the COVID-19 Pandemic
After decades of increasing numbers (since the early 1980s), the SSDI caseload peaked in 2014
and has been declining ever since. Figure 1 shows the numbers of SSDI beneficiaries, new awards, and
exits from 2001 to 2019. From the figure we can see that the recent decline in the SSDI caseload was
driven both by fewer new awards (declining since 2010) and more exits from the program. The annual
number of exits has nearly doubled—mostly due to population aging—and, beginning in 2014, has
exceeded the number of new awards. The number of new awards has also dropped because of population
aging: as the large Baby Boomer cohort moves out of age-eligibility for the program, the next-in-line
cohorts are smaller. In addition, the number of new awards may have fallen because of improving
economic conditions after the Great Recession and policy changes that effectively tightened standards at
the appellate level (Ray and Lubbers 2014).
Figure 1 here
Exits from SSDI may be due to one of several reasons, including death of the beneficiary (28% of
disabled workers in 2019), conversion to Social Security benefits upon reaching full retirement age (60%),
cessation of SSDI benefits due to medical improvement (4%), and cessation of benefits because the
beneficiary has consistently earned more than the threshold for substantial gainful activity (6%) (SSA
2020). Figure 2 focuses specifically on exits due to successful return-to-work (SSA, 2002-2020). Although
the vast majority of exits are due to people aging out of the program at the full retirement age, there has
been a surprising increase in voluntary exits from the SSDI program due to work. While work exits are
rare, they nearly doubled between 2001 and 2019 (from 29,000 to 55,850).
Figure 2 here
It is possible that the strong labor market during the recent expansion (until 2020) drove the trend
in work exits. Indeed, Figure 3 shows that employment gains among workers with disabilities were not
limited to SSDI beneficiaries alone; after decades of steady decline, the employment rate among workers
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with disabilities started increasing in 2014 and seemed to stabilize at a rate of approximately one in five
workers with disabilities by the late 2010s. By comparison, the employment rate for workers without
disabilities remained roughly steady around 70 percent from the late 1980s to 2019, except for dips during
recessions (denoted by the shaded areas). Although speculative, this may point to structural changes in
employers’ willingness to hire individuals with disabilities, perhaps in response to growing labor demand
pressures associated with population aging (Maestas et al., forthcoming).
Figure 3 here

Enter COVID
Although the SSDI program is not intended to be an alternative to labor force participation when
economic conditions are weak, a robust literature has shown a negative relationship between economic
conditions and SSDI applications and awards (see e.g., Stapleton et al. 1988; Black et al. 2002; Cutler et
al. 2012; Maestas et al. 2015; Charles et al. 2018; Maestas et al. 2021). For example, Maestas et al. (2021)
estimated that the steep increase in unemployment levels during the Great Recession induced nearly one
million SSDI applications that otherwise would not have been filed, of which 41.8 percent were awarded
benefits, resulting in over 400,000 new beneficiaries who made up 8.9 percent of all SSDI entrants
between 2008-2012. They also showed that recession-induced SSDI applicants had less severe
impairments (and thus greater work capacity) than the average SSDI applicant during this period.
Furthermore, using administrative Medicare data from 1991-2015, Carey et al. (2022) found that
recession-induced SSDI beneficiaries had lower Medicare spending than average (an indication of better
average health), and they argued that the cyclical pattern in healthcare spending of beneficiaries was driven
by differences in the composition of new entrants rather than by poor economic conditions leading to
worsening health.
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Figure 4 shows the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in the US between May 2002 and May
2022. Two stark differences between the Great Recession and the COVID-19 recession are immediately
apparent. First, the spike in the unemployment rate at the start of the COVID recession was more than
twice as large as the increase in unemployment triggered by the Great Recession. The average
unemployment rate in 2007, before the Great Recession, was 4.6 percent, and the peak unemployment
rate, in October 2009, was 10 percent—a difference of 5.4 percentage points, or just slightly larger than a
twofold increase. By contrast, the average unemployment rate in 2019 was 3.7 percent and the peak
unemployment rate of the COVID recession, in April 2020, was 14.7 percent—a difference of 11
percentage points, and nearly a fourfold increase.
Figure 4 here
Second, the COVID recession was much shorter (March 2020-April 2020) than the Great
Recession (December 2007-June 2009), and the unemployment rate took much less time to return to prerecession levels. By March 2022, two years after the start of the pandemic, the unemployment rate was
3.6 percent, below the 2019 average unemployment rate of 3.7 percent. By contrast, the recovery from the
Great Recession took much longer; it took nearly eight years for the unemployment rate to return to within
8 percent of its pre-recession level (5%, in September 2015).
Despite these differences, certain fundamentals of the COVID-19 recession appear to be similar
to prior recessions. For example, like other recessions, the COVID recession impacted the less educated
the most. This is notable because disability determinations based on the medical-vocational grid take
education into account. Given two applicants having the same functional impairments but one lacks a high
school degree, the less educated applicant is more likely to qualify for SSDI benefits because they have
fewer transferable skills than the more educated applicant. If the effects of unemployment on SSDI
applications and awards are approximately linear and stable over time, then, taken together, these factors
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suggest the effect of the COVID-19 recession could have been about a quarter the size of the effect of the
Great Recession.1
This has certainly not been the case. The most recent data on the number of SSDI applications and
beneficiaries through May 2022, presented in Figure 5, show no signs of rebounding to their pre-COVID
levels (SSA 2022). This is consistent with analyses of SSA’s State Agency Monthly Workload Data,
which show that at least one year into the pandemic (and adjusting for state and month fixed effects), there
was no discernible increase in the application rate for DI benefits and, in fact, DI application rates per
100,000 people ages 20-64 fell in March 2020 and have remained at a lower level through at least February
2022 (Goda et al. 2021, 2022).
Figure 5 here
There are several potential explanations for the surprising lack of an application response to the
COVID recession. Unprecedented unemployment insurance expansions and stimulus payments may have
helped mitigate the impact of the COVID recession. In addition, unlike prior recessions, the COVID
recession was the result of a global pandemic which led to massive changes in US mortality and morbidity.
Whereas the effect of the mortality increase on SSDI program costs is offsetting (people die earlier than
they would have absent COVID), the increase in morbidity from Long COVID could further increase
SSDI applications, but likely over a longer time horizon. Finally, one very important factor unique to the
COVID-19 pandemic was the widespread closure of SSA field offices from March 17, 2020 through April
7, 2022. Deshpande and Li (2019) found that, prior to the pandemic, closing an SSA field office led to a
persistent 16 percent decline in the number of SSDI beneficiaries in the surrounding areas. The
corresponding decrease in disability applications was only 10 percent, suggesting field office closures
disproportionately affected those with more severe impairments. If there is pent-up demand for SSDI
benefits, applications could rise as normal operations resume in 2022.
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Potential Long-Run Effects
Two years after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate has recovered to
2019 levels, and there is excess demand for labor. Under these conditions, workers initially displaced by
the COVID recession have likely found new employment, and therefore any pent-up demand for SSDI
benefits may have dissipated by now.
An open question, however, is whether the disabling effects of Long COVID could cause a wave
of disability applications in the future. As many as 30 percent of COVID-19 cases result in Long
COVID—defined as experiencing at least one persistent symptom six months later (Logue et al. 2021).
Current estimates imply that more than 25 million Americans may have Long COVID, although this
includes mild symptoms (e.g., loss of taste or smell) as well as more severe symptoms (e.g., fatigue). It
remains to be understood how many Long COVID translate to cases of disability. Figure 6 shows that
there has been a steady increase since mid-2020 in the percent of Americans ages 18-64 who report at
least one of six disabling conditions (hearing difficulty, visual difficulty, cognitive difficulty, ambulatory
difficulty, self-care difficulty, and independent living difficulty) in the Current Population Survey.
Whether this uptick will lead to an increase in SSDI applications and awards will depend on whether
people can establish eligibility under SSDI’s strict disability determination criteria.
Figure 6 here
In addition to affecting disability insurance applications and beneficiaries in the short run through
its effects on the economy, the COVID-19 pandemic may also impose lasting effects on the nature of work
that could affect the ability of people with disabilities to remain in the labor force. One way the COVID19 pandemic could enable work is through the widespread expansion of telework, defined as the ability
to work remotely from home or another location that is not the premises of one’s employer. Telework is
a much-needed accommodation for some people with disabilities. The US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission was urged to issue guidance that telework is a reasonable accommodation under the
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Americans with Disabilities Act if an employer allowed it during a pandemic (Wagstall and Quasius
2020). At the same time, telework is only possible for certain workers in certain industries, and people
with disabilities tend to be concentrated in industries that require in-person work. For example, Schur et
al. (2020) estimated that telework is possible for only 34 percent of people with disabilities, compared to
40 percent of people without disabilities. At the same time, they found that 13.5 percent of people with
disabilities lived in homes without internet access, compared to 6 percent of people without disabilities.
At the same time, it is possible that the COVID-19 pandemic could accelerate employer
automation of tasks or robotization, disproportionately affecting workers in more easily routinized jobs.
Additionally, the expansions of telework and automation could both have downstream effects on job
demands that intensify long-term shifts toward increasingly sedentary and cognitively demanding jobs
(Lopez Garcia et al. 2020). Future research will be needed to assess long-term changes in the nature of
work as a result of the pandemic.

Conclusion
COVID-19 is a novel disease that has had dramatic effects on morbidity and mortality in the US
population, while launching a global economic recession. In prior recessions, there was a positive
relationship between the unemployment rate and DI applications and awards. This relationship, however,
did not emerge in the wake of the COVID recession. Although the COVID recession disproportionately
affected less educated workers as in prior recessions, there were also unique features that may have altered
the relationship between unemployment and DI incidence. These include the prolonged closure of the
SSA field offices, the unprecedented expansion of unemployment insurance benefits and economic
stimulus payments, and the exceptionally quick economic recovery. Although it is unlikely that there is a
substantial amount of pent-up demand for SSDI benefits among workers who were displaced during the
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COVID recession, there could yet be a steady inflow of applications in the future from people experiencing
disabling effects from Long COVID.

9
References
Black, D., K. Daniel, and S. Sanders (2002). ‘The Impact of Economic Conditions on Participation in
Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust.’ American Economic Review 92(1): 27–
50.
Carey, C., N. H. Miller, and D. Molitor (2022). ‘Why Does Disability Increase During Recessions?
Evidence from Medicare.’ NBER Working Paper No. 29988. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Charles, K., Y. Li, and M. Stephens (2018). ‘Disability Benefit Take-Up and Local Labor Market
Conditions.’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(3): 416–423.
Cutler, D., E. Meara, and S. Richards-Shubik (2012). ‘Unemployment and Disability: Evidence from the
Great Recession.’ NBER Retirement Research Center Paper No. NB 12-12. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Deshpande, M., & Y. Li (2019). ‘Who is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability
Programs.’ American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(4): 213-48.
Flood, S., M. King, R. Rodgers, S. Ruggles, J. R. Warren, and M. Westberry (2021). Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 9.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS.
https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V9.0
Goda, G. S., E. Jackson, L. H. Nicholas, and S. S. Stith (2021). ‘The Impact of Covid-19 on Older Workers'
Employment and Social Security Spillovers.’ NBER Working Paper No. 29083. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Goda, G. S., E. Jackson, L. H. Nicholas, and S. S. Stith (2022). ‘The Impact of Covid-19 on Older Workers'
Employment and Social Security Spillovers: Evidence from Year 2.’ Slides presented at NBER
Conference ‘The Labor Market for Older Workers, Spring 2022.’
Logue, J. K., N. M. Franko, D. J. McCulloch, D. McDonald, A. Magedson, C. R. Wolf, and H. Y. Chu

10
(2021).

‘Sequelae

in

Adults

at

6

Months

After

COVID-19

Infection.’ JAMA

Netw

Open. 2021;4(2):e210830. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.0830
Lopez Garcia, I., N. Maestas, and K. J. Mullen (2020). ‘The Changing Nature of Work and Work
Capacity.’ MRDRC Working Paper 2020-415. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Retirement and Disability
Research Center.
Maestas, N., K. J. Mullen, and D. Powell (Forthcoming). ‘The Effect of Population Aging on Economic
Growth.’ American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Maestas, N., K. J. Mullen, and A. Strand (2015). ‘Disability Insurance and the Great Recession.’ American
Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 105(5): 177-182.
Maestas, N., K. J. Mullen, and A. Strand (2021). ‘The Effect of Economic Conditions on the Disability
Insurance Program: Evidence from the Great Recession.’ Journal of Public Economics, 199, 104410.
Ray, G. K. and J. S. Lubbers (2014). ‘A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis by the Social
Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Conference of the United States) Is
Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication.’ George Washington Law Review, 83(4/5):
1575-1608.
Schur, L. A., M. Ameri, and D. Kruse (2020). ‘Telework After COVID: A “Silver Lining” for Workers
with Disabilities?’ Journal of Occupational Rehabilitation, 30(4): 521-536.
Stapleton, D., K. Coleman, K. Dietrich, and G. Livermore (1988). ‘Empirical Analyses of DI and SSI
Application and Award Growth.’ In K. Rupp and D. Stapleton, eds., Growth in Disability Benefits:
Explanations and Policy Implications. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, pp. 31–92.
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2022). Civilian Labor Force Level [CLF16OV], retrieved from
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLF16OV, February 15,
2022

11
US Social Security Administration (SSA) (2001-2021). Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security
Disability Insurance System. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
US Social Security Administration (SSA) (2022). Selected Data from Social Security's Disability
Program.

Washington,

DC:

US

Government

https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/dibStat.html, retrieved June 15, 2022.

Printing

Office.

12
Endnotes
1

The average difference in unemployment rate from 2007, over the eight years between 2008 and 2015,

was 2.9. The average difference in unemployment rate from February 2020, over the two years between
March 2020 and 2022, was 2.9.
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Figure 1. Awards into and exits from the DI program
Source: Beneficiaries in Current-Payment Status (Table 1) and Benefits Awarded, Withheld, and
Terminated (Tables 35 and 49). Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
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